OPEC and non-OPEC oil production and the global economy  by Ratti, Ronald A. & Vespignani, Joaquin L.
Energy Economics 50 (2015) 364–378
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /enecoOPEC and non-OPEC oil production and the global economy☆Ronald A. Ratti a,c,1, Joaquin L. Vespignani b,c,⁎
a University of Western Sydney, School of Business, Australia
b University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, Australia
c Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Australia☆ The authors would like to thank Jian Tian and W
comments.
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 3 62262825.
E-mail addresses: r.ratti@uws.edu.au (R.A. Ratti), Joaq
(J.L. Vespignani).
1 Tel.: +61 2 9685 9346.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.12.001
0140-9883/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.Va b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 15 July 2014
Received in revised form 28 October 2014
Accepted 5 December 2014
Available online 13 December 2014
JEL classiﬁcation:
E31
E32
Q43
Keywords:
OPEC production
Non-OPEC
Oil price
Global oil marketHamilton identiﬁes 1973 to 1996 as “the age of OPEC” and 1997 to the present as “a new industrial age.” During
1974–1996 growth in non-OPEC oil production Granger causes growth in OPEC oil production. OPEC oil produc-
tion decreases signiﬁcantlywith positive shocks to non-OPEC oil production in the earlier period, but does not do
so in the “new industrial age”. In the “new industrial age”OPEC oil production rises signiﬁcantlywith an increase
in oil prices, unlike during “the age of OPEC” period. OPEC oil production responds signiﬁcantly to positive inno-
vations in global GDP throughout. Over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 the negative effect on real oil price of positive shocks
to non-OPEC oil production is larger in absolute value than that of positive shocks to OPEC oil production. The
cumulative effects of structural shocks to non-OPEC oil production and to real oil price on OPEC oil production
are large. The cumulative effects of structural shocks to OPEC production and real oil price on non-OPEC produc-
tion are small. Results are robust to changes inmodel speciﬁcation. An econometric technique to predict growth
inOPEC oil production provides support for the results from the SVAR analysis. Results are consistentwith impor-
tant changes in the global oil market.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).2 Analysis of OPEC behavior has focused on models of production for oil producers. Lin
(2009) provides a review of work on the world oil market based on optimal non-
renewable resource extraction models. Huntington (1994) shows that intertemporal op-
timization models did not function as well as predicting the world oil market as recursive1. Introduction
Hamilton (2013) identiﬁes ﬁve main periods associated with signif-
icant changes in the price of oil; 1859–1899, 1900–1945, 1946–1972,
1973–1996 and 1997–present. Hamilton (2013) describes the latter
two periods as “The age of OPEC” and “Anew industrial age”, respective-
ly. Hamilton associates the “The age of OPEC”with themove to a higher
average real oil price, the change in the focus of the global oil market
from North America to the Persian Gulf, and with assertive behavior
by OPEC. “A new industrial age” is connected with the tremendous
economic growth in the major emerging economies, particularly China
and India. Hamilton (2013) notes that the recently industrialized econ-
omies have absorbed over two-thirds of the increase in world oil
consumption since 1998 and that this pattern of absorption of oil
resources is likely to continue into the future. Kilian and Hicks (2013)
show that rapid growth in emerging economies drove the rise in real
oil price over 2003–2008.
In this paper we model the behavior of real oil price and OPEC and
non-OPEC production behavior during the “The age of OPEC” fromenying Yao for their helpful
uin.Vespignani@utas.edu.au
. This is an open access article under1973 to 1996 and “A new industrial age” from 1997 to the present.
The behavior of the two types of producers has been differentiated in
the literature and their behavior has changed over time. Dées et al.
(2007) report policy simulations indicating that non-OPEC production
is inelastic to changes in price and that OPEC decisions about production
impact oil prices. Barros et al. (2011) ﬁnd that shocks affecting the
structure of OPEC oil production are highly persistent. Kaufmann et al.
(2008) ﬁnd that real prices generally have a positive effect on produc-
tion by OPEC members.2 Lin (2009) identiﬁes 1990–2006 to be a time
of a largely competitive oil market, with the periods 1973–1981 and
1981–1990 having the market strongly inﬂuenced by OPEC.
Huppmann and Holz (2012) argue that there has been a change in
behavior in the crude oil market since 2008 with OPEC having lesssimulation models. Ramcharran (2002) estimates a negative and signiﬁcant price elastic-
ity of supply for OPEC. Kaufmann et al. (2004) ﬁnd that OPEC inﬂuences real oil prices and
that models not allowing for the endogeneity of oil price cannot provide tests of compet-
ingmodels of production behavior. Gately (2007) observes that in discussingOPEC oil out-
put relative to non-OPEC output in the composition of global oil production it is important
to recognized that oil consumption in OPEC countries is rising rapidly. Gately et al. (2013)
point out that OPEC's domestic oil consumption has risen steeply since the 1970s and that
collectively in recent years OPEC oil consumption approaches that of China.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
9.2
9.7
10.2
10.7
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
OPEC oil producon (logs of millions of barriels per day)
non-OPEC oil producon (logs of millions of barriels per day)
Notes: Oil production in log of millions of barrels
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Saudia Arabia Rest of OPEC
a)
b)
Fig. 1. a: Oil production for OPEC and non-OPEC countries (quarterly data):1974:Q1 to 2012:Q4. b: Oil production for Saudi Arabia and for OPEC minus Saudi Arabia (quarterly
data):1974:Q1 to 2012:Q4.
365R.A. Ratti, J.L. Vespignani / Energy Economics 50 (2015) 364–378market power, in contrast to before 2008 when Saudi Arabia acted as
Stackelberg leader with a non-cooperative OPEC. Kolodzeij and
Kaufmann (2014) argue that failure to model OPEC and non-OPEC oil
production separately (and to just focus on aggregate global oil produc-
tion) will lead to underestimation of the inﬂuence of supply shocks on
real oil prices.
An increase in economic growth in developing countries may be
associated with a higher expected growth for commodity demand
than an increase in growth in developed countries. Radetzki (2006)
ﬁnds that growth in emergingmarket countries is associated with a rel-
atively greater usage of commodities than in expansion in developed
economies.3 Roberts and Rush (2010) report that commodity resources
are used relatively intensive in traded goods and that growth in trade is
a driving force in the growth of developing countries. Developing Asia
grew at an average annual pace of 8.5% over the period between 2003
and 2013. The IMF expects developed economies to grow 2.2% in 2014
and developing economies to grow at almost 6% in 2014.4
In this paper we estimate the interrelationship between OPEC oil
production, non-OPEC production, global aggregate demand and real
oil pricewith a structural VARmodel. Results are consistentwith funda-
mental and related changes in the global oil market, based on strong
global demand maintaining real oil price at high levels over most of
1997:Q1–2012:Q4, a steady upward trend in non-OPEC oil production
over the last forty years, and a change in the behavior of OPEC from
reacting to non-OPEC oil production to responding to higher real oil
price.3 Radetzki (2006) ﬁnds that a dollar added to the GDP in developing Asian countries
uses more than twice the quantity of commodities as does a dollar added to the GDP in
OECDcountries. Ratti and Vespignani (2013a) ﬁnd that liquidity growth in China has a sig-
niﬁcant effect on crude oil price over 1997–2011.
4 IMF Global Prospects and Polices can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/weo/2013/01/.We ﬁnd that growth in OPEC oil production moves to offset growth
in non-OPEC production during 1974:Q1–1996:Q4, but not during
1997:Q1–2012:Q4. Growth in OPEC oil production is not inﬂuenced by
oil price during 1974:Q1–1996:Q4, but is inﬂuenced during 1997:Q1–
2012:Q4. Growth in non-OPEC oil production responds signiﬁcantly to
positive innovations in real oil price over 1974:Q1–1996:Q4. Growth
in non-OPECoil production does not respond signiﬁcantly to positive in-
novations in real oil price over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4, possibly because real
oil price during this period is above a threshold required for non-OPEC
to maximize production.5 Over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 the negative effect
on real oil price of positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production
is larger in absolute value than that of positive shocks to growth in OPEC
oil production. Previously (over 1974:Q1–1996:Q4) growth in non-
OPEC production didn't have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on real oil
price (due to offsetting OPEC adjustments).
Shocks to growth in OPEC oil production make large cumulative
contribution to real oil price. Shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil produc-
tion do not. The cumulative contribution to growth in OPEC oil produc-
tion of real price shocks is large whereas that of growth in non-OPEC oil
production is small. There is a large cumulative contribution to growth
in OPEC oil production of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production,
but that reverse does not hold. The effect of shocks to growth in non-
OPEC oil production on cumulative growth in OPEC oil production is
larger over 1974–1996 than over 1997–2012.
Using an econometric technique to predict growth in OPEC oil
production, developed by Lewellen (2004) and Westerlund and
Narayan (2012, 2014), we ﬁnd support for the results from the SVAR
analysis. During the ﬁrst period, growth in OPEC oil production can be
predicted by growth in non-OPEC oil production and global GDP5 Ghalib (2004) estimates that among non-OPEC producers, the price ranges from a low
of $12 for Norway to a high of more than $35 for Mexico that they require to balance the
current account of their balance of payments.
7 Hamilton (2013) notes that contributing factors to stagnation of oil production overall
over 2002–2008 include instability in Iraq and Nigeria, reduced production in the North
Sea and by Mexico and Indonesia, and Saudi production being lower in 2007 than in
2005. Kaufmann (2011) attributes the sharp rise in oil price in 2007–2008 to ﬂat non-
OPEC oil production combinedwith exhaustion of OPEC spare capacity to increase oil pro-
duction in the face of strong demand. Hamilton (2013) andWTRG Economics (2014) pro-
Notes: Nominal oil price is US dollar index. Real oil price is nominal oil price divided by US CPI index.
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Fig. 2. Nominal and real oil prices index 1974:Q1 = 100.
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can be predicted by growth in oil prices and global GDP growth. This ev-
idence conﬁrms Hamilton's (2013) view of OPEC moving to a more
market-orientated strategy from 1997.
The behavior of OPEC oil production, non-OPEC oil production and
real oil prices is discussed in Section 2. The econometric model, data
and variables are presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the empiri-
cal results. Section 5 considers robustness of results to changes in
identiﬁcation strategy, change in variables from real to nominal and var-
iation in lag structure. In Section 6 the predicted power of non-OPEC
production, global aggregate demand and real oil price on OPEC oil
production is examined. Section 7 concludes.
2. Oil prices, and OPEC and non-OPEC oil production
The behavior of OPEC and non-OPEC oil production over 1974 to
2012 is shown in Fig. 1a and within OPEC oil production of Saudi
Arabian oil production in Fig. 1b. Nominal and real oil price is shown
in Fig. 2. The nominal and real oil price in U.S. dollars is based on an
index of 100 in 1974:Q4. Striking features in Fig. 1a and b are the falls
in OPEC oil production and Saudi oil production from the end of the
1970s through the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. This is due to several factors,
some more transitory than others. During the Iranian revolution, oil
production fell between November 1978 and June 1979 by about 2.0–
2.5 million barrels per day of oil. This reduction was mostly reversed
shortly after the revolution. The onset of the Iran–Iraq War in Septem-
ber 1980 caused a further major fall in the output of both countries.
During the losses in oil production through the Iranian revolution
and Iran–Iraq War, the nominal price of crude oil went from $14 in
1978 to $35 per barrel in 1981. The high oil prices in the 1970s lead to
increased investment in production by non-OPEC countries, which
resulted in ongoing increases in production well into the 1980s even
after oil prices, subsided in real terms. OPEC reacted to lower real prices
and increased production by non-OPEC countries by trying to restrict
production with quotas over 1982 to 1985. Up until early 1986, Saudi
Arabia cut production in an attempt to offset the fact that many OPEC
countries exceeded agreed production restrictions, after which time
Saudi production rose substantially.6 This behavior in Saudi oil produc-
tion is illustrated in Fig. 1b.
In 1990 oil price rose sharply with Iraqi's invasion of Kuwait and the
GulfWar that followed.With the ﬁrst GulfWar in 1990:8, oil production
collapsed in Iraq and Kuwait. Oil production by Saudi Arabia increased
sharply to partially (and substantially) offset this collapse. Oil produc-
tion in Kuwait had recovered by the early 1993. Oil production in Iraq
remained relatively stable until the end of the 1990s. The price cycle6 Cairns and Calfucura (2012) argue that Saudi Arabia's objective is to set oil production
to moderate oil prices so as to preserve a market for oil in the long run. Alkhathlan et al.
(2014) also note that Saudi Arabia's intention is the stability of OPEC and the global oil
market and that they will increase oil production to offset negative oil supply shocks.then turned up. Growth in Asia over 1990 to 1997 contributed to
world oil consumption and oil price increases. Non-OPEC oil production
fell in the early 1990s attendant on a major decline in Russian produc-
tion between 1990 and 1996.
The recovery fromAsian Financial Crisis resulted inworld petroleum
consumption growth from 1999 onwards until the onset of recession in
the U.S. beginning in March of 2001. In 2003 there were Venezuelan
political unrest and the second Persian Gulf War. The rapid increase in
oil price leading to a peak in June 2008 is associatedwith rapid econom-
ic growth in major emerging economies, particularly China and India,
and with low spare production capacity.7 The fall in oil price from July
2008 to January 2009 is related to the Global Financial Crisis during
late 2008, recession in the U.S. over December 2007 to June 2009, and
weak growth in Europe. Also OPEC decreased production target from
September 2008 to January 2009. Concurrent with the Global Financial
Crisis and the weak global economy the spot price for crude oil remains
subdued before re-bounding by April 2011 while the global economic
activity remains subdued.83. Literature review on structural breaks in oil prices
The paper contributes to the structural break literature on oil prices
by determining the characteristics of different periods such as “the age
of OPEC” and “a new industrial age”. Consideration of structural breaks
in the behavior of oil price goes back at least to Hamilton (1983) with
recognition of a OPEC induced sharp rise in oil price in 1973.9 The
recognition of structural breaks in oil prices can inﬂuence conclusions
concerning the time series properties of the oil price data. If the
existence of structural breaks is not correctly taken into account, inaccu-
rate conclusions may be arrived at concerning the times series
properties of the data. This is an important issue in that if oil prices
are stationary there is mean reversion, but if oil prices have a unit root
then shocks have permanent effects. Pindyck (1999) and Ferreira et al.
(2005) do not allow for structural breaks and conclude that oil prices
are non-stationary. Maslyuk and Smyth (2008) with weekly data and
Ghoshray and Johnson (2010) with monthly data permit up to two
structural breaks and are unable to reject the null of unit root. Mishra
and Smyth (2014) report that recognizing heteroskedasticity invides authoritative reviews of oil shocks and oil price behavior for an extended period.
8 Ratti and Vespignani (2013b) attribute the high crude oil prices despite weak global
activity after 2009 to substantial increases in global liquidity.
9 More recently it is recognized that oil price is endogenous and dependent on econom-
ic and ﬁnancial conditions worldwide (Kilian, 2009).
Table 1
Test for unit roots 1974:Q1–2012:Q4.
Level ADF KPSS First difference ADF KPSS
log (OOPt) −1.35 0.64b Δlog (OOPt) −10.73a 0.24
log (NOOPt) −2.52 1.14a Δlog (NOOPt) 3.13b 0.43
log (GGDPt) −1.47 1.54a Δlog (GGDPt) −6.53a 0.34
log (OPt) −0.78 0.80a Δlog (OPt) −10.14c 0.11
Notes: The null hypothesis for the ADF test is a variable and has a unit root and the null
hypothesis for the KPSS test is a variable and is stationary. The ﬁrst difference of the series
is indicated by Δ. The lag selection criteria for the ADF is based on Schwarz information
Criteria (SIC) and for the KPSS is the Newey–West Bandwidth.
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level of signiﬁcance.
b Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of signiﬁcance.
c Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 10% level of signiﬁcance.
367R.A. Ratti, J.L. Vespignani / Energy Economics 50 (2015) 364–378addition to two structural breaks in daily energy data results in theﬁnd-
ing that prices are mean reverting.10
In the oil price literature, different structural breaks have been
found, at least in part because different timeperiods have been analyzed
and different frequencies of data were utilized. For example, using daily
data Arouri et al. (2012) ﬁnd one structural break in 1997 and multiple
breaks in 2008 in the gasolinemarket using data from January 2 1986 to
October 20, 2009. Using monthly data from January 1961 to August
2011, Noguera (2013) found several structural breaks: when the data
is used in levels a structural break is found for January 1978 and for
both levels and trends he found structural breaks for July 1979, February
1986, February 1991, July 1998 andNovember 2008 (during our sample
period). The important issues of unit root, co-integration and structural
breaks in the global oil price data are considered in the next section.
4. Methodology
Themethodology of the paper is based onKilian (2009), butwith the
novelty that growth in global oil production is differentiated into
growth in OPEC oil production and growth in non-OPEC oil production.
Consider a SVAR constructed with quarterly data from 1974:Q1 to
2012:Q4, with the following variables: OPEC oil production (OOPt),
non-OPEC oil production (NOOPt), purchase power parity measure of
global GDP in U.S. dollars (GGDPt) and oil prices (OPt). Both, oil prices
and global GDP (PPP) in U.S. dollars are deﬂated by the U.S. GDP
deﬂator.
The SVAR model can be expressed as:
B0Xt ¼ β þ
X j
i¼1BiXt−i þ εt ð1Þ
where j is the optimal lag length determined by the Schwarz criterion
(BC), one lag in this case, and εt denotes the vector of serially and
mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. The vector Xt can be
expressed as:
Xt ¼ △ log OOPtð Þ;△ log NOOPtð Þ;△ log GGDPtð Þ;△ log OPtð Þ½ : ð2Þ
Contemporaneous restrictions are based on Killian (2009) and are
summarized in the following equation:
BoXt ¼
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
−b31 −b32 1 0
−b41 −b42 −b43 1
2
664
3
775
△ log OOPtð Þ
△ log NOOPtð Þ
△ log GGDPtð Þ
△ log OPtð Þ
2
664
3
775: ð3Þ
Eq. (4) implies that shocks to both growth in OPEC and growth in
non-OPEC oil production are assumed to not respond to the other
structural shocks within the same quarter. This assumption is based in
Kilian (2009) and supported by the LM ratio of over-identiﬁed restric-
tions test, which support zero restrictions for− b12 or− b21. In Kilian
(2009) real oil price is in log-level, and aggregate demand and oil
production are in percentage changes.
Growth in global GDP is assumed to respond contemporaneously to
growth in both oil productions, but not to oil prices. This implies that
global production could be affected by, for example, an oil production
shortage. Nevertheless, growth in global output or growth in GDP is
expected to respond with some delay to growth in oil prices given
that production decisions cannot be made in response to short term10 The literature on the time series properties of energy prices in the presence of struc-
tural breaks is extensive. Using weekly data between 1991 and 1996, and allowing one
break in 1994, Gulen (1999) ﬁnds non-stationarity for several spot prices. Serletis
(1992) allows for endogenously determined structural breaks in ﬁnding that daily energy
futures price data are not stationary. In contrast, Lee et al. (2006) allow for two endoge-
nously determined structural breaks and a quadratic trend and Lee and Lee (2009) allow
for multiple breaks ﬁnd evidence of supportive of stationary real resource price series.
Noguera (2013) andMishra and Smyth (2014) provide extensive reviews of the literature
on investigations of the time series properties of energy prices.price ﬂuctuations. Finally, growth in oil prices responds contemporane-
ously to growth in oil productions and growth in global output.
4.1. Data and variables
The sample period is from1974:Q1 to 2012:Q4. The study uses quar-
terly data so as to make use of a broad indicator of global economic
activity provided by a proxy for global GDP which can be constructed
at this frequency.11 A proxy variable for global GDP (GGDP)t is provided
by the aggregated purchase power parity GDP in U.S. dollars for the U.S.,
the European Union countries, Australia, Canada, China, Ireland, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway and Turkey.12 Oil price (OPt) is
the spot price of Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil from the U.S.
Department of Energy. These countries account for more than 80% of
global GDP for most of the data period. The starting date is dictated by
the availability of oil price data. The OPEC oil production (OOPt) and
non-OPEC oil production (NOOPt) data in millions of barrels average
pumped per day from the U.S. Department of Energy. Real variables
are nominal variables deﬂated by the U.S. CPI from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
4.2. Unit root, co-integration and structural breaks
4.2.1. Unit root and structural breaks
We started the analysis of the data by carrying out the Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF), Dickey Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) and the Phillip–Perron
(PP) unit root tests for all variables in the model without considering
structural breaks. Results are reported in Table 1 and reveal that the
logs of OPEC oil production, non-OPEC oil production, real global GDP
and real oil price are ﬁrst difference stationary. Those results are
conﬁrmed by the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test
where the inverse null hypothesis is tested. The null hypothesis of
unit root cannot be rejected even at 10% level for those series in levels
but can be rejected at 1% level of signiﬁcant for these series in ﬁrst
differences.
Perron (1989) shows that if there exists a one-time permanent
change in the data, the ADF test for unit root could be biased towards
reducing the ability to reject a false unit root null hypothesis. To deal
with this issue we carry out Perron's (1997) unit root test which allows
identiﬁcation of a structural break endogenously from the data. Results
of Perron's (1997) unit root test are shown in Fig. 3. This test suggests
that the most signiﬁcant structural break in the data occurs in
1996:Q4. In Table 2, results show that the null hypothesis that real oil
price has a unit root with a structural break in both intercept and11 Finding a good scale variable for global real activity at a frequency greater than quar-
terly is difﬁcult. In his inﬂuential contribution to analysis of the global determinants of real
oil prices withmonthly data, Kilian (2009) introduced the dry bulk shipping cost as an in-
dicator of global demand for commodities. Kolodzeij and Kaufmann (2014) argue that the
connection between dry bulk maritime freight costs and oil prices is due to the relation-
ship between oil prices and the cost of transportation.
12 The quarterly Chinese GDPdata are interpolated from annual Chinese purchase power
parity GDP in U.S. dollars from OECD statistical tables.
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Fig. 3. (Perron, 1997) Break point and unit root test.
Table 2
Perron (1997)'s unit root test with structural break.
Null Hypothesis: log of real oil prices has a unit root with a structural break in intercept
and trend
Perron's (1997) unit root test −3.58
1% critical value −6.32
5% critical value −5.59
10% critical value −5.29
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(2013) claims of an important structural break in the oil market in
1997 and also that real oil price contains a unit root even when a struc-
tural break is considered.
Consequently, we considered this result and Hamilton's (2013) idea
that during the period of analysis important change in the drivers of oil
price occurs in the ﬁrst quarter of 1997 as demand for oil by China and
India intensiﬁes. We also use the traditional Chow (1960) break point
test for the points 1979:Q3, 1986:Q1, 1998:Q3 and 2008:Q4 following
the ﬁndings by Noguera (2012) with monthly data, and the point
1997:Q1 indicated by Hamilton (2013) and identiﬁed out by Perron's
(1997) test.
We found that at quarterly frequency, the three different versions of
the Chow test indicate structural change only from 1997:Q1. Speciﬁcal-
ly, the F-statistic for this test was 74.52, the Log likelihood ratio 61.52
and the Wald statistics 74.51. Thus the null hypothesis of no breaks at
this speciﬁc breakpoint can be rejected at 1% level, conﬁrming
Hamilton's hypothesis.13 On the contrary, the null hypothesis of no
breaks at this speciﬁc breakpoint cannot be rejected at 10% level for
the other points tested (results available upon request).4.2.2. Cointegration
Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000) show that it is possible to account
for structural breaks in testing for cointegration by developing a maxi-
mum likelihood approach that allows for possible shifts in the mean of
the data. Consequently, we test cointegration among the variables
log(OOPt), log(NOOPt), log(GGDPt) and log(OPt) using Saikkonen and
Lutkepohl (2000) in a VAR framework. Results are presented in
Tables 3 and 4 for both trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statis-
tics. No evidence of cointegration vectors among the variables
log(OOPt), log(NOOPt), log(GGDPt) and log(OPt) is found.14 The conﬁdence bands are obtained usingMonte Carlo integration as described by Sims5. Empirical results
Results from estimating the SVARmodel in Eqs. (1)–(3) will now be
reported. By way of introduction, preliminary causality results for
growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production for both “the age of
OPEC” and “a new industrial age” are reported. In Table 5 it is found
that during “the age of OPEC”, growth in non-OPEC oil production
Granger causes growth in OPEC oil production while growth in OPEC
oil production does not Granger cause growth in non-OPEC oil produc-
tion. During the new industrial age, growth in OPEC oil production does
not Granger cause growth in non-OPEC oil production and growth in
non-OPEC oil production does not Granger cause growth in OPEC oil
production.13 For details about Chow test, please see Chow (1960) and Andrews and Fair (1988).5.1. Impulse response function results (full sample model)
Fig. 4 shows the responses of the variables in the SVAR to one-
standard deviation structural innovations. The SVAR is estimated with
data over 1974:Q1–2012:Q4. The dashed lines represent a one standard
error conﬁdence band around the estimates of the coefﬁcients of the im-
pulse response functions.14 In the ﬁrst column the responses of growth
in OPEC oil production, non-OPEC oil production, global GDP, and real
price of oil to a structural (positive) innovation in growth in OPEC oil
production are shown. The effect of an unanticipated supply increase
on growth in OPEC oil production is very persistent and highly signiﬁ-
cant. An unanticipated innovation in growth in OPEC oil production
does not cause a signiﬁcant effect on growth in global real GDP. An un-
anticipated positive innovation in growth in OPEC oil production causes
a signiﬁcant negative effect on the growth in real price of oil that
persists in magnitude from the second quarter onwards.
In the second column of Fig. 4 a positive innovation in growth in
non-OPEC oil production has a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect
on growth inOPEC oil production that is very persistent. The implication
is that OPEC restricts growth in productionwhen there is an unexpected
increase in growth in non-OPEC oil production. A positive innovation in
growth in non-OPEC oil production on growth in non-OPEC oil produc-
tion is very persistent and highly signiﬁcant. A positive shock to growth
in non-OPEC oil production causes a negative effect on the growth in
real price of oil that is only statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst quarter,
after which the absolute magnitude of the effect declines and becomes
insigniﬁcant.
The effects of positive shocks to growth in global GDP are considered
in the third columnof Fig. 4. A positive shock growth in global GDP has a
positive effect on growth in OPEC oil production that is statistically sig-
niﬁcant and that grows over time. Eventually growth in OPEC oil pro-
duction responds by a large amount to the growth in global GDP
shock. A positive growth in global GDP shock has a negative effect on
growth in OPEC oil production that is not statistically signiﬁcant (except(1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR
coefﬁcient.
Table 5
Causality test of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production.
Null hypothesis: x does not Granger cause y
Granger test/lags The age
of OPEC
(1974–1996)
The new
industrial age
(1997–2012)
1 4 1 4
Δlog (OOPt) does not granger cause Δlog (NOOPt) 0.01 0.52 0.031 2.05
Δlog (NOOPt) does not granger cause Δlog (OOPt) 15.22a 2.76b 0.001 1.30
Notes: Variables are in logs.
a Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Table 4
Saikkonen and Lütkepohl cointegration tests (with breaks) 1974:Q1–2012:Q4
Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)).
Hypothesized no. of
CE(s)
Eigenvalue Trace
statistic
0.05 critical
valuea
Prob.b
None 0.150 24.647 27.584 0.113
At most 1 0.096 15.250 21.131 0.271
At most 2 0.030 4.695 14.264 0.779
At most 3 0.012 1.931 3.841 0.164
Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level.
a Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level.
b MacKinnon et al. (1999) p-values.
Table 3
Saikkonen and Lütkepohl cointegration tests (with breaks) 1974:Q1–2012:Q4
Cointegration Rank Test (Trace).
Hypothesized no. of
CE(s)
Eigenvalue Trace
statistic
0.05 critical
value
Prob.**
None 0.150 46.525 47.856 0.066
At most 1 0.096 21.877 29.797 0.305
At most 2 0.030 6.627 15.497 0.621
At most 3 0.012 1.931 3.841 0.164
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GDP results in a signiﬁcant increase in growth in real oil price that builds
up over the ﬁrst three years and then is sustained at a large value.15
The effects of an oil market-speciﬁc demand shock are shown in
column 4 of Fig. 4. In the last row of column 4 a positive shock in oil
market-speciﬁc demand shock has a large and persistent positive effect
on the growth in real price of oil. This effect is highly statistically signif-
icant and rises in magnitude over the ﬁrst three quarters. A positive oil
market-speciﬁc demand shock is not associated with signiﬁcant effects
on growth in OPEC oil production, but is linked with signiﬁcant
increases in growth in non-OPEC oil production. A positive oil market-
speciﬁc demand shock has a negative effect on growth in global GDP.
The effect is statistically signiﬁcant in the third quarter.5.2. Impulse response function results for 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 and
1997:Q1–2012:Q4
In Figs. 5 and 6 the responses of the variables in the SVAR to one-
standard deviation structural innovations are shown when the SVAR is
estimated with data over 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1–2012:Q4,
respectively. The objective is to determine whether there has been a
change in the responses of growth in OPEC and in non-OPEC oil produc-
tion to each other and to growth in global GDP and to change in real oil
price over time.5.2.1. “The age of OPEC”
In Fig. 5 impulse response function results are presented for the
SVAR estimated 1974:Q1–1996:Q4. Overall, the impulse response re-
sults for the “age of OPEC” period are very similar to those for the overall
sample in Fig. 4. The one noticeable difference is that an unanticipated
increase global GDP growth does not result in a signiﬁcant effect on
the change in real oil price for the model estimated over 1974:Q1–
1996:Q4. Conversely a negative shock to global GDP does not result in
a signiﬁcant change in real oil price over this period.15 This result is similar to theﬁndings by Kilian (2009) for 1973:1-2007:12withmonthly
data in that a positive shock to global real aggregate demand for all industrial commodities
resulted in a signiﬁcant oil price increase that builds up over the ﬁrst year and then is
sustained at a large value.5.2.2. “A new industrial age”
In Fig. 6 impulse response function results are presented for the
SVAR estimated over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4. The impulse response results
for the “A new industrial age” include several changes compared to
the results for overall sample in Fig. 4. First, OPEC oil production growth
no longer declines with positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil
production. Second, OPEC oil production growth responses to positive
innovations in global GDP growth are still signiﬁcant, but are now
much smaller over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 than for the full sample or for
the 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 period. Third, OPEC oil production growth now
rises signiﬁcantly with an increase in the change in oil prices (this is
consistent with Hamilton (2009)). Fourth, over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4,
change in real oil price continues to respond negatively to positive
shocks to OPEC oil production growth (the effect is smaller and less
signiﬁcant than previously), but change in real oil price now also
responds negatively and signiﬁcantly to positive shocks to non-OPEC
oil production growth. Fifth, over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 the negative effect
on change in real oil price of positive shocks to non-OPEC oil production
growth is larger in absolute value than that of positive shocks to OPEC
oil production growth. Sixth, non-OPEC oil production growth does
not respond signiﬁcantly to positive innovations in change in real oil
price over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4.5.3. Historical decomposition of real oil price
The cumulative contribution to the change in real price of oil of the
structural shocks to growth in OPEC oil production and growth in
non-OPEC oil production are reported in Fig. 7a, from estimating the
SVAR model in Eqs. (1)–(3). The cumulative contributions of structural
shocks to real oil price in Fig. 7a are three year annual averages to
improve the readability of the plot. In Fig. 7a the cumulative contribu-
tion to real oil price of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production
are comparatively small compared to the cumulative contribution to
real oil price of shocks to growth in OPEC oil production.
A striking observation in Fig. 7a is that from 1981 to 1986 growth in
OPEC oil production makes the greatest cumulative contribution to real
oil price over the whole period. This is because OPEC oil production fell
from levels over 25 million barrels a day in monthly data for several
years leading up to August 1980, to levels barely above 13 million
barrels a day in monthly data from February 1983 to June 1985.16 This
huge reduction in OPEC oil production in the early 1980s, due to revolu-
tion/wars and decisions on oil production by Saudi Arabia, means that
even though real oil price fell over the period, the fall would have
been even greater if the fall in OPEC production had not occurred. This
is reﬂected in large positive cumulative contribution to real oil price
by shocks to growth in OPEC oil production in the early 1980s.16 Inmonthly data, OPEC oil production peaked inDecember 1976 at 33.1million barrels
a day. Production thennever fell below 25million barrels a day inmonthly data upAugust
1980. Production was 30.4 million barrels a day in July 1979.
Fig. 4. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks: 1974:Q1–2012:Q4.
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and non-OPEC oil production falls.17 This is reﬂected in Fig. 7a by a
positive cumulative contribution to real oil price of shocks by growth
in non-OPEC oil production and negative cumulative contribution to
real oil price of shocks by growth in OPEC oil production over 1987 to
1991. Thereafter, the largest cumulative contributions to real oil price
of shocks from growth in oil production are by growth in OPEC oil
production over 1999–2002 (positive), 2005 (negative) and 2009–
2012 (negative). 18
The cumulative contributions to growth in OPEC oil production and
to growth in non-OPEC oil production of shocks to the real price are
reported in Fig. 7b. In Fig. 7b the cumulative contribution to growth in
non-OPEC oil production of shocks to the real price is small. The cumu-
lative contribution to growth in OPEC oil production of real price shocks
is large in Fig. 7b. Increases in real oil price are associated with positive
cumulative contribution to growth in OPEC oil production over 1977–
1981, 1989–1990, 1997, 2001–2002, 2005–2008 and 2012. Decreases
in real oil price are associated with negative cumulative contribution
to growth in OPEC oil production over 1983–1988, 1994, 1998, 200317 Inmonthly data, non-OPEC oil production peaked (up until that point) inMay 1988 at
39.6 million barrels a day. Production then fell for several years, with a local minimum of
35.0million barrels a day in September 1993. This fall in non-OPECoil production is driven
by the dramatic decline in Russian production oil production.
18 Over 1998 tomid-2003 OPEC oil production goes up and down around the 28million
barrels a day mark. OPEC oil production has local maxima in September 2005, July 2008
and April 2012, and a local minimum in February 2007.and 2009. Despite dramatic increases in the real price of oil over the
2002 to 2008 period, growth in non-OPEC oil production didn't respond
in the short-run.19
The cumulative contributions to growth in OPEC oil production of
shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production and the reverse are
reported in Fig. 7c. A conspicuous result in Fig. 7c is that there is a
large cumulative contribution to growth in OPEC oil production of
shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production, but that the reverse
does not hold. It is also apparent that the effect of shocks to growth in
non-OPEC oil production on cumulative growth in OPEC oil production
is larger in the ﬁrst half of the sample than in the second half of the
sample. Non-OPEC oil production is generally rising from 1974 to the
mid-1980s, is largely ﬂat running in the region of 38 million barrels a
day from 1984 to 1988, after which point production falls until late-
1993 (a local minimum of 35.0 million barrels a day in September
1993 monthly data). The 1984 to 1993 period of ﬂat and falling non-
OPEC oil production is associated with positive cumulative growth in
OPEC oil production. From late 1993 non-OPEC production generally
gradually rose to 42.6 million barrels a day in May 2005, after which
point non-OPEC production ﬂat lined with ﬂuctuations usually above
40.0 million barrels a day.19 From1974 to 1978, theworld crude oil price is in a period ofmoderate decline. During
this period OPEC productionwas relatively ﬂat near 30million barrels per day. Production
was 30.4 million barrels a day in July 1979.
Fig. 5. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks during the age of OPEC 1974:Q1–1996:Q4.
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growth in non-OPEC production inﬂuences growth in OPEC production,
real oil price inﬂuences growth in OPEC production and growth in OPEC
production inﬂuences real oil price. The cumulative effect of structural
shocks to growth in OPEC production and real oil price on growth in
non-OPEC production is relatively small.
5.4. Variance decomposition analysis
5.4.1. Decomposition of OPEC and non-OPEC production
The forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) of OPEC and
non-OPEC production are reported in Table 6 from the estimation of
the structural VAR model in Eqs. (1), (2) and (3). Decompositions of
the forecast error variance provide insight on the percent contribution
of structural shocks in the global oil market on growth in OPEC and
non-OPEC production. FEVDs are reported for 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 and
1997:Q1–2012:Q4.
At one year horizon, oil market-speciﬁc demand shock forecasts
2.08% of variation in growth in OPEC oil production during 1974:Q1–
1996:Q4 and a statistically signiﬁcant 21.18% during 1997:Q1–
2012:Q4. Growth in global GDP shocks project 6.01% of variation in
growth in OPEC oil production during 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 and only
5.72% during 1997:Q1–2012:Q4.
Growth in non-OPEC oil production forecasts a statistically signiﬁ-
cant 12.92% of variation in growth in OPEC oil production during
1974:Q1–1996:Q4 and only 0.22% during 1997:Q1–2012:Q4. Theforecast error variance decomposition results conﬁrm that growth in
OPEC oil production is much more inﬂuenced by change in real oil
price during 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 than during 1974:Q1–1996:Q4, and
more responsive to growth in non-OPEC production during 1974:Q1–
1996:Q4 than during 1997:Q1–2012:Q4.
5.4.2. Contributions to global GDP and oil prices: “The age of OPEC” and “A
new industrial age”
Table 7 reports the forecast error variance decompositions of growth
global GDP and change in oil prices in 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1–
2012:Q4. During 1997:Q1–2012:Q4, growth OPEC oil production and in
non-OPEC oil production forecast 6.02% and 6.54% of the variation in
growth in oil price at the one year horizon, respectively. Over
1974:Q1–1996:Q4, the ability of growth in OPEC oil production and in
non-OPEC oil production to forecast oil price captured by oil market-
speciﬁc demand is much smaller. During 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 at the one
year horizon growth in non-OPEC oil production forecasts 3.91% of the
variation in growth in global GDP, and during 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 OPEC
oil production forecast 2.56% of the variation in growth in global GDP.
6. Robustness analysis and alternative speciﬁcations
In this section, we examine the robustness of our model to: different
identiﬁcations strategies, different measure of oil prices and lag
structure in the VAR model.
Fig. 6. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks during the new industrial age 1997:Q1–2012:Q4.
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The decomposition of oil production in OPEC and non-OPEC produc-
tion has been studied in a macroeconomic model in Eq. (3) that follows
Kilian's (2009) VAR analysis of the determinants of real oil price, but
with growth in oil production differentiated into growth in OPEC oil
production and growth in non-OPEC oil production. In Eq. (3) growth
in OPEC oil production and growth non-OPEC oil production do not
depend contemporaneously on each other. We now explore two of
alternative contemporaneous restrictions for these variables. The alter-
native contemporaneous restrictions (analyzed in turn in conjunction
with Eqs. (1) and (2)) are presented in Eqs. (4) and (5):
BoXt ¼
1 −b12 0 0
0 1 0 0
−b31 −b32 1 0
−b41 −b42 −b43 1
2
664
3
775
△ log OOPtð Þ
△ log NOOPtð Þ
△ log GGDPtð Þ
△ log OPtð Þ
2
664
3
775 ð4Þ
BoXt ¼
1 0 0 0
−b21 1 0 0
−b31 −b32 1 0
−b41 −b42 −b43 1
2
664
3
775
△ log OOPtð Þ
△ log NOOPtð Þ
△ log GGDPtð Þ
△ log OPtð Þ
2
664
3
775: ð5Þ
In Eq. (4) we allow growth in OPEC oil production to depend
contemporaneously on growth in non-OPEC oil production, and in
Eq. (5) growth in non-OPEC oil production depends contemporaneouslyon growth in OPEC oil production. Both new speciﬁcations yield similar
results to those results obtained in Figs. 4, 5 and 6.
6.2. Nominal global GDP and nominal oil prices
We also speciﬁed the model using nominal global GDP and nominal
oil prices. We observe that general results hold in terms of sign and
statistical signiﬁcance, while responses are somewhat larger. We also
note somedifference in the variancedecomposition results for the nom-
inal model. These results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. The main
differences between the real and nominal can be seen by comparing
Table 6 with Table 8 and Table 9 with 6.
The forecast error variance decompositions of growth in OPEC and
non-OPEC production with nominal variables are reported in Table 9.
A main difference in results is that greater fractions of growth in OPEC
oil production are predicted by growth in nominal GDP than by growth
in real GDP in both periods (and especially during 1997:Q1–2012:Q4
when the fraction predicted by growth in nominal GDP is 19.94%). How-
ever, the ﬁndings earlier show that growth in non-OPEC production
forecasts growth in OPEC production during 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 is
robust to this change in model speciﬁcation.
6.3. Lags structures in the SVAR model
We check the sensitivity of our results to the lag selection strategy.
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is alsowidely used in time series
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Fig. 7. a: Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil. b: Cumulative effect of structural shocks to real oil price on growth in OPEC oil production and non-OPEC oil production.
c: Cumulative effect of structural shocks on growth in OPEC oil production by growth in non-OPEC oil production and the reverse.
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selected two lags (or six months). We re-estimated themodel with two
lags andwe ﬁnd that results are very similar to those already estimated,
although the error bands in the impulse response function slightly
increase.Table 6
Variance decomposition of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production.
OPEC oil production
Age of OPEC (1974–1996)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices
2 81.60 13.40 4.11 0.90
4 78.94 12.96 6.01 2.08
8 78.72 12.92 6.26 2.08
Non-OPEC oil production
Age of OPEC (1973–1996)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices
2 7.10 86.81 0.10 5.97
4 7.04 85.44 1.42 6.08
8 7.03 85.12 1.76 6.076.4. The Global and Asian Financial Crises
The Global Financial Crisis was associated with dramatic changes in
commodity prices and the behavior of key macroeconomic variables.
Perri and Quadrini (2011), for example document unprecedentedNew industrial age (1997–2012)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices
2 81.21 0.07 1.17 17.53
4 72.86 0.22 5.72 21.18
8 72.71 0.23 5.93 21.13
New industrial age (1997–2012)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices
2 0.39 97.09 2.23 0.27
4 0.42 93.92 2.26 0.40
8 0.42 96.90 2.27 0.40
20 Note that all variables are only ﬁrst difference stationary and therefore changes in log
transformation have been applied.
Table 8
Variance decomposition of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production (nominal model).
OPEC oil production
Age of OPEC (1974–1996) New industrial age (1997–2012)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices
2 77.44 13.19 9.36 0.00 2 81.45 0.00 11.14 7.40
4 76.15 13.13 9.82 0.90 4 74.48 0.11 17.50 7.88
8 76.15 13.13 9.82 0.90 8 74.10 0.10 17.94 7.83
Non-OPEC oil production
Age of OPEC (1973–1996) New industrial age (1997–2012)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC Global GDP Oil prices
2 8.54 86.97 0.69 3.80 2 0.25 98.73 0.00 1.01
4 8.50 85.98 1.61 3.90 4 0.30 98.38 0.23 1.04
8 8.49 85.95 1.64 3.90 8 0.31 98.36 0.28 1.04
Note that in this Table global GDP and oil prices are in nominal terms.
Table 7
Contribution of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production after 4 lags (1 year) to growth in global GDP and oil prices.
Global GDP Oil prices
Age of OPEC (1973–1996) New industrial age
(1997–2012)
Age of OPEC (1973–1996) New industrial age
(1997–2012)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC OPEC Non-OPEC Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC OPEC Non-OPEC
2 2.20 0.19 0.00 3.95 2 2.65 0.08 4.83 6.71
4 2.54 0.19 0.11 3.91 4 2.65 0.18 6.02 6.54
8 2.56 0.19 0.11 3.91 8 2.65 0.18 6.02 6.53
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the last two quarters of 2008. The authors argue that this is due to the
fact that in the last two quarters of 2008, GDP declined by a substantial
amount in all G7 countries. To correspond to this analysis, we introduce
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in Q3 and Q4 2008 and 0
otherwise into Eqs. (1) to (3). Results are essentially unchanged from
those in Figs. 5 and 6 from following this strategy for dealing with the
Global Financial Crisis (and are available from the authors).
Some authors have attributed a structural break in the oil market to
the Asian Financial Crisis. Arouri et al. (2012) argue that as a conse-
quence of the Asian economic and ﬁnancial crisis a possible structural
break occurred in 1997 in the oil market. Maslyuk and Smyth (2008)
also claim that the most signiﬁcant events around the period 1997–
1998 that could disrupt the oil market have been the Asian Financial
Crisis and Russian default. These factors may indeed reinforce the
ﬁnding of a break between the two periods identiﬁed by Hamilton
(2013) as “The age of OPEC”, 1973–1996, and “A new industrial age”,
1997–present. Radelet and Sachs (1998) identify recognition of the
start of the Asian Financial Crisis with the sharp devaluation of the
Thai Baht on 2 July 1997, but note that underlying problems predate
this event. As observed earlier, we identify the structural break in the
oil market as occurring in 1996:Q4 in line with the Perron's (1997)
test result.
7. Predicting growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production and real
oil prices
In this section we use we use recent developed econometric
techniques to estimate whether or not it is possible to infer the predict-
ability of growth in OPEC oil production, non-OPEC oil production and
real oil prices using the variables in the previous sections for the periods
of interest 1974:Q1–1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1–2012:Q4. Thiswill provide a
further test of the robustness of the results obtained from SVAR analysis.
A potential problemwith prediction of OPEC or of non-OPEC oil produc-
tion is that innovations in the prediction variables are correlated with
the variables being predicted. An additional potential problem is that
growth in oil production is heteroskedastic, making it challenging toassess the value of information coming from the predictors. For these
reasons we employ an OLS bias-adjusted heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors and covariance technique due to Lewellen (2004),
Westerlund and Narayan (2012) and Narayan et al. (2014) to predict
OPEC and non-OPEC oil production. Fan and Yao (2003) provide a
detailed discussion of techniques for forecasting when innovations in
the prediction variables are correlated with the variables being predict-
ed and there is heteroskedasticity.
7.1. Econometric framework
Consider the following extension of Lewellen (2004) applied to
OPEC oil production20:
△ log OOPtþh
  ¼ α þ β△ log NOOPð Þt þ γ△ log GGDPtð Þ
þ τ△ log OPtð Þ þ ϵtþh: ð6Þ
Eq. (6) states that growth inOPEC oil production h periods ahead can
be predicted by contemporaneous growth in non-OPEC oil production,
growth in global GDP and growth in oil prices. In thismodel we are test-
ing the null hypothesis that either β = 0, γ = 0 or τ = 0, to test
whatever or not growth in non-OPEC oil production, growth in global
GDP and or growth in oil prices, respectively, has any signiﬁcant predic-
tive power for growth in OOPt + h. A possible shortcoming of this
predicting regression is that if growth in NOOPt, in GGDPt or in OPt is
endogenous then their coefﬁcients will be biased. Now, consider the
following version of autoregressive processes for growth in NOOPt,
growth in GGDPt, and growth in OPt:
△ log NOOPtþh
  ¼ μnoop 1−ρð Þ þ ρ△ log NOOPtð Þ þ εnoop;tþh; ð7Þ
△ log GGDPtþh
  ¼ μggdp 1−ρð Þ þ ρ△ log GGDPð Þt þ εggdp;tþh; ð8Þ
Table 9
Contribution of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production after 4 lags (1 year) to growth in global GDP and oil prices (nominal model).
Global nominal GDP Oil prices (nominal)
Age of OPEC (1973–1996) New industrial age
(1997–2012)
Age of OPEC (1973–1996) New industrial age
(1997–2012)
Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC OPEC Non-OPEC Quarters OPEC Non-OPEC OPEC Non-OPEC
2 4.63 1.64 1.75 0.46 2 4.47 0.10 4.79 5.68
4 4.83 1.61 3.20 0.40 4 4.46 0.35 5.74 5.60
8 4.84 1.61 3.35 0.39 8 4.45 0.35 5.74 5.61
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  ¼ μop 1−ρð Þ þ ρ△ log OPtð Þ þ εop;tþh; ð9Þ
where: |ρ| ≤ 1. To avoid the endogeneity problem that biases estimates
of the coefﬁcients β, γ and τ, Lewellen (2004) proposes a regression to
capture the possible endogenous effect by assuming the following
relationship:
ϵt ¼ β1εnoop;t þ γ1εggdp;t þ τ1εop;t þ σnoop;t þ σggdp;t þ σop;t ; ð10Þ
where ϵt and εnoop,t, εggdp,t, εop,t have amean of zero and ϵt is not correlat-
ed with either εnoop,t, εggdp,t or εop,t. An extended version of Lewellen's
(2004) methodology can be inferred by making Eq. (6) conditional to
Eq. (10). The equation can be writing as:
△ log OOPtþh
  ¼ α þ β△ log NOOPtð Þ þ β1△log NOOPtþh−ρNOOPtþh−1
 
þγ△ log GGDPtð Þ þ γ1△log GGDPtþh−ρGGDPtþh−1
 
þ τ△ log OPtð Þ þ τ1△log OPtþh−

ρOPtþh−1 þ σ tþh: ð11Þ
Because ρ is unknown, Eq. (11) cannot be estimated. To solve this
issue Lewellen (2004) assumes that the unknown ρ= 0.999.21 Given
that the value of ρ can be taken as a given (by assumption) Eq. (11)
can be estimated as:
△ log OOPtþh
  ¼ α þ β0△ log NOOPtð Þ þ β1△log NOOPtþh−ρ0NOOPtþh−1
 
þγ0△ log GGDPtð Þ þ γ1△log GGDPtþh−ρ0GGDPtþh−1
 
þτ0△ log OPtð Þ þ τ1△log OPtþh−

ρ0OPtþh−1 þ σ tþh: ð12Þ
In Eq. (12)we have β0= β− β1(ρ− ρ0), γ0= γ− γ1(ρ− ρ0), τ0=
τ− τ1(ρ− ρ0) and α is a constant. Accordingly, β0, γ0 and τ0 are the
bias-adjusted predictor coefﬁcients of growth in NOOPt, GGDPt or OPt,
respectively. Making Eq. (6) conditional to Eq. (10) the correlations
among ϵt and εnoop,t,εggdp,t and εop,t can be accounted for.
Analogues to Eqs. (12), (13) and (14) can be used to estimate the
predictability power of growth OPEC oil production, growth in global
GDP and growth in real oil price on growth in non-OPEC oil production,
and the predictability power of growth in OPEC oil production, growth
non-OPEC oil production and growth in global GDP on growth in real
oil prices. The prediction equations for growth in non-OPEC oil produc-
tion and growth in real oil price are given by
△ log NOOPtþh
  ¼ υþ δ0△ log OOPtð Þ þ δ1△log OOPtþh−ρ0OOPtþh−1
 
þϑ0△ log GGDPtð Þ þ ϑ1△log GGDPtþh−ρ0GGDPtþh−1
 
þφ0△ log OPtð Þ þ φ1△log OPtþh−ρ0OPtþh−1
 þ σ tþh
ð13Þ21 Note thatWesterlund and Narayan (2012) andNarayan et al. (2014) provide an alter-
native assumption for ρ, that ρ ¼ 1þ cT, where c ≤ 0 is a drift parameter that measures the
degree of persistency in the predictor variable and T is the number of observations.and
△ log OPtþh
  ¼ ζ þ λ0△ log NOOPtð Þ þ λ1△log NOOPtþh−ρ0NOOPtþh−1
 
þη0△ log GGDPtð Þ þ η1△log GGDPtþh−ρ0GGDPtþh−1
 
þκ0△ log OOPtð Þ þ κ1△log OOPtþh−ρ0OOPtþh−1
 þ σ tþh:
ð14Þ
7.2. Results
In Tables 10, 11 and 12, the bias-adjusted OLS heteroskedasticity
consistent standard error results are reported from estimating
Eqs. (12),(13) and (14), respectively. In the Tables results are presented
for 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4 in columns 1, 3 and 5 with different setting
values of ρ. In columns 2, 4 and 6 the same estimation is presented,
but for the period 1997:Q1 to 2012:Q4. In columns 1 and 2 we follow
Lewellen (2004) in setting ρ = 0.999. We also report the results
following Westerlund and Narayan (2012) and Narayan et al. (2014)
in setting ¼ 1þ cT. In columns 3 and 4, c = 0, and in columns 5 and 7,
c=−2.
7.2.1. Predicting growth in OPEC oil production
In Table 10, we report results for the estimation of growth in OPEC
oil production in Eq. (12). During the period 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4,
estimates of the coefﬁcient β0 are statistically signiﬁcant from zero at
the 5% level for all three assumptions for ρ. The point estimates suggest
that a 1% point increase in growth in non-OPEC oil production is
associated with a reduction of about 1.6% points in growth in OPEC oil
production. Given that during 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4 non-OPEC oil pro-
duction is about 50% greater than OPEC oil production, the point
estimate of β0 suggests a fall in production by OPEC (compared to
where it would have been) that is approximately equal to the
increase in production by non-OPEC (compared to where it would
have been). For the period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4, growth in OPEC oil
production does not signiﬁcantly respond to growth in non-OPEC
oil production.
During the periods 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4, an increase in growth in
global real GDP has a statistically signiﬁcant effect at 1% level on growth
in OPEC oil production. From 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4, growth in OPEC oil
production responds signiﬁcantly to increase in growth in global real
GDP at the 5% or 10% levels, depending on the assumption made
about ρ. However, there is a substantial reduction in magnitude of the
estimated effect of growth in global real GDP on growth in OPEC oil
production for the periods 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4 compared to the periods
1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4.
For the periods 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4, growth in OPEC oil production
responds signiﬁcantly to growth in real oil prices, but does not do so
during 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4. Estimates of τ0 indicate that a 1% point
rise in growth real oil price leads to an increase in growth in OPEC oil
production of around 0.05% points during 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4. These
forecast results conﬁrm that the ﬁndings for the early period, 1974:Q1
to 1996:Q4, that growth in OPEC oil production responds to growth in
Table 10
Forecasts of growth in OPEC oil production. Results of OLS bias-adjusted heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance under different ρ-values and h= 1.
Dependant variable: growth in OPEC oil production
ρ= 0.999 ρ= 1 ρ ¼ 1þ −2T
1974–1996 1997–2012 1974–1996 1997–2012 1974–1996 1997–2012
Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE)
α −0.031a −0.003 −0.031a −0.003 −0.031a −0.003
(0.011) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
β0 −1.652b 0.237 −1.651b 0.238 −1.678b 0.236
(0.715) (0.377) (0.655) (0.426) (0.648) (0.421)
β1 1.372b 0.051 1.372a 0.051 1.372a 0.051
(0.556) (0.250) (0.517) (0.280) (0.517) (0.282)
γ0 5.051a 1.023c 5.060a 1.023b 5.026a 1.018b
(1.368) (0.525) (1.337) (0.486) (1.327) (0.488)
γ1 1.697 0.234 1.697 0.234 1.697 0.234
(1.305) (0.654) (1.175) (0.701) (1.175) (0.701)
τ0 −0.074 0.047b −0.075 0.047b −0.073 0.047b
(0.062) (0.023) (0.047) (0.021) (0.046) (0.021)
τ1 −0.068 0.003 −0.068 0.003 −0.068 0.003
(0.049) (0.018) (0.046) (0.022) (0.046) (0.023)
R2 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.28
adj. R2 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.21
F-stat. 7.45 3.77 7.45 3.77 7.45 3.77
n 90 64 90 64 90 64
Lag order was selected by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Results are robust when a dummy variable accounting for the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) is introduced for the third and fourth quarters of 2008, in line with Perri and Quadrini (2011) identiﬁcation of this crisis.
a Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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for the later period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4.
7.2.2. Predicting growth in non-OPEC oil production
We now turn to the estimation of Eq. (13), where growth in non-
OPEC oil production is the dependant variable. In Table 11, the only
adjusted-bias predictor coefﬁcient which is statistically signiﬁcant is
φ0, indicating that a 1% point increase in real oil prices is associatedTable 11
Forecasts of growth in non-OPEC oil production. Results of OLS bias-adjusted heteroskedasticit
Dependant variable: growth in non-OPEC oil production
ρ= 0.999 ρ= 1
1974–1996 1997–2012 1974–1996
Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE
υ 0.002a −0.001b 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
δ0 0.036 0.007 0.036
(0.025) (0.089) (0.024)
δ1 0.027c 0.011 0.026c
(0.015) (0.079) (0.015)
ϑ0 0.329 0.198 0.329
(0.280) (0.224) (0.281)
ϑ1 0.329 0.074 0.328
(0.269) (0.313) (0.268)
φ0 0.020c 0.001 0.021c
(0.012) (0.001) (0.013)
φ1 0.000 0.016c 0.000
(0.000) (0.008) (0.009)
R2 0.10 0.07 0.10
adj. R2 0.04 0.03 0.04
F-stat. 1.64 0.7 1.64
n 90 64 90
Lag order was selected by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Standard errors are given in paren
(GFC) is introduced for the third and fourth quarters of 2008, in line with Perri and Quadrini (
a Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.with about a 0.02% point rise in growth in non-OPEC oil production.
For the periods 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4, no predictor coefﬁcients are
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Dées et al. (2007)
note that non-OPEC oil production is limited by geological and institu-
tional conditions, with the implication that growth in non-OPEC oil
production is not responsive in the short-run to the variables growth
in global real GDP, growth in OPEC oil production and growth in real
oil price.y consistent standard errors and covariance under different ρ-values and h= 1.
ρ ¼ 1þ −2T
1997–2012 1974–1996 1997–2012
) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE)
−0.001 0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
0.007 0.035 0.236
(0.089) (0.024) (0.421)
0.011 0.026c 0.051
(0.079) (0.015) (0.282)
0.198 0.329 0.197
(0.229) (0.281) (0.225)
0.075 0.328 0.075
(0.314) (0.269) (0.315)
0.001c 0.021c 0.001c
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
0.017c 0.000 0.016c
(0.008) (0.000) (0.007)
0.07 0.10 0.07
0.03 0.04 0.03
0.7 1.64 0.7
64 90 64
thesis. Results are robust when a dummy variable accounting for the Global Financial Crisis
2011) identiﬁcation of this crisis.
Table 12
Forecasts of real oil price. Results of OLS bias-adjusted heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance under different ρ-values and h= 1.
Dependant variable: growth in real oil price
ρ= 0.999 ρ= 1 ρ ¼ 1þ −2T
1974–1996 1997–2012 1974–1996 1997–2012 1974–1996 1997–2012
Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE)
ζ −0.020b −0.020 −0.021 −0.020 −0.020 −0.020
(0.028) (0.020) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027)
λ0 −0.528 −2.410 −0.527 −2.413 −0.546 −2.352
(1.894) (2.414) (1.894) (2.416) (1.880) (2.390)
λ1 0.929 −3.074c 0.929 −3.074c 0.930 −3.074c
(1.181) (1.769) (1.180) (1.769) (1.181) (1.769)
η0 3.904 10.342a 3.902 10.357a 3.933 10.008a
(3.682) (3.970) (3.683) (3.950) (3.659) (3.890)
η1 −1.522 17.442a −1.522 17.442a −1.521 17.442a
(2.340) (6.208) (2.340) (6.208) (2.340) (6.208)
κ0 −0.688c −0.358 −0.689c −0.358 −0.681c −0.372
(0.376) (1.191) (0.377) (1.192) (0.373) (1.175)
κ1 −0.387 0.748 −0.387 0.747 −0.387 0.748
(0.271) (1.144) (0.271) (1.144) (0.271) (1.144)
R2 0.07 0.36 0.07 0.36 0.07 0.36
F-stat. 1.00 5.44 1.00 5.44 1.00 5.44
n 90 64 90 64 90 64
Lag order was selected by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Results are robust when a dummy variable accounting for the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) is introduced for the third and fourth quarters of 2008, in line with Perri and Quadrini (2011) identiﬁcation of this crisis.
a Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Indicates coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
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In Table 12, we report results for the estimation on Eq. (14), where
growth in real oil price is predicted. Consistent, with Hamilton's
(2011) view, there are remarkable changes between the two periods
in terms of the variables that have predictive power for growth in real
oil price. During the periods 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4 only growth in OPEC
oil production is statistically signiﬁcant in explaining growth in real oil
prices (indicated by statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient κ0). For
the periods 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4 only growth in real global GDP is statis-
tically signiﬁcant in explaining real oil prices (reﬂected by statistical
signiﬁcance of η0).
8. Discussion and conclusion
Hamilton identiﬁes 1973 to 1996 as “the age of OPEC” and 1997 to
the present as “a new industrial age.” The impulse response results for
the “A new industrial age” suggest a number of changes compared to
the results for “the age of OPEC”. First, growth in OPEC oil production
decreases signiﬁcantly with positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil
production in the earlier period, but does not do so in the “new industri-
al age”. In the “new industrial age” growth in OPEC oil production rises
signiﬁcantly with an increase in oil prices, unlike during “the age of
OPEC” period. Growth in OPEC oil production response to positive inno-
vation in growth in global GDP is statistically signiﬁcant but much
smaller over 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 than over the 1974:Q1–1996:Q4
period. During 1997:Q1–2012:Q4 the negative effect on change in real
oil price of positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production is
larger in absolute value than that of positive shocks to growth in OPEC
oil production.
Structural shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production make a
large cumulative contribution to growth in OPEC oil production. The
reverse does not hold. The effect of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil
production on cumulative growth in OPEC oil production is larger over
1974–1996 than over 1997–2012. Shocks to growth in OPEC oil
production make large cumulative contribution to change in real oil
price and vice versa. Shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production do
not make a large cumulative contribution to change in real oil price
and vice versa.Results are consistent with important changes in the global oil
market. Strong global demand has maintained real oil price at high
levels over most of 1997:Q1–2012:Q4. There has been a major change
in the behavior of OPEC from reacting to non-OPEC oil production
from 1974 to 1996 and to responding to higher real oil price from
1997 to 2012. Consistent with the results from the SVAR analysis, the
use of a new econometric prediction technique suggests that during
the “the age of OPEC”, growth in OPEC oil production can be predicted
by growth in non-OPEC oil production and growth in global economic
growth, and that during the “new industrial age” period, growth in
OPEC oil production can be predicted by change in real oil prices and
growth in global GDP. These ﬁndings suggest a more market-oriented
oil production strategy by OPEC since 1997.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.12.001.References
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